In Germany, it has been called the “Deutschlandtempo” since 2022: the unprecedented speed at which LNG terminals, solar parks and — more importantly — high-voltage connections are being built. SuedLink, a 700-kilometre direct-current cable running from the North Sea to Bavaria, received accelerated permits in 2024 and is scheduled to enter service in 2028. In that same year, TenneT Netherlands hopes to commission the first sections of the Net op zee IJmuiden Ver Alpha project — a scheme whose timeline has slipped repeatedly over the past decade.
Two neighbouring countries, the same European grid code, largely the same equipment, even the same transmission operator on the German side (TenneT). And yet: fundamentally different results. What explains the difference? And more importantly: what works, what does not, and what can Dutch network operators and stakeholder managers adopt from the German approach?
The German approach: legislation as accelerator
Since 2022 Germany has passed a series of laws explicitly aimed at accelerating energy infrastructure. The LNG-Beschleunigungsgesetz (2022) came first. It was followed by the Energiesicherungsgesetz, an amended Netzausbaubeschleunigungsgesetz (NABEG), and in 2023 the declaration that renewable energy and its associated grid are “im überragenden öffentlichen Interesse” — of overriding public interest.
The legal weight of that last phrase is crucial. When weighing nature, landscape or resident objections against grid expansion, the public interest of the grid now takes precedence in principle. Courts apply stricter standards of review, procedures are bundled, and objection windows have been shortened. Alongside this, Germany now makes greater use of the lighter Plangenehmigung procedure instead of the heavier Planfeststellung — a simpler permitting track permitted for less invasive route changes.
The results are visible in the numbers. The Bundesnetzagentur reports that in 2024 and 2025, more kilometres of high-voltage corridor were approved than in the five preceding years combined. SuedLink, SuedOstLink and Ultranet — three large DC connections — are now ahead of schedule.
The Dutch approach: poldering under pressure
The Netherlands has no equivalent legislation. It does have instruments: the Crisis and Recovery Act, the National Coordination Scheme, and since 2024 the Multi-Year Infrastructure Energy and Climate Programme (MIEK). But none of these explicitly declares specific projects of “overriding public interest” in a way that materially shortens objection procedures.
Instead, the Netherlands relies on early participation, regional coordination (through provincial programmes and the pMIEK), and — increasingly — on area-based deals with residents: coupled opportunities, compensation packages, area funds. This is the polder model in its purest form: the problem is not closed off legally but resolved socially.
Sometimes this works brilliantly. The search for a route for the 380 kV Vierverlaten–Ens connection was laborious for years, but ultimately delivered a broadly supported preferred alternative. The Net op zee Hollandse Kust connection was completed on time. But it also regularly does not work: Zuid-West 380 kV ran up a ten-year delay, and several 150 kV connections in Noord-Brabant and Gelderland remain stuck in preferred-variant discussions.
Comparison on four criteria
A fair comparison requires more than “how fast does it go”. The real question is: what does each approach deliver in terms of lead time, local support, legal durability and cost?
1. Lead time from decision to commissioning. Germany wins here unambiguously. The average lead time for a 380 kV corridor in Germany fell from roughly 12 years to 7–8 years between 2022 and 2025. The Netherlands remains stuck at 10–13 years, with outliers of 15 or more. The difference lies not in the construction phase — which is comparable — but in permitting and objections.
2. Local support. The picture here is less clear-cut. A 2025 Wuppertal Institut study showed that in SuedLink corridor regions, appreciation for the energy transition has fallen since 2022, while it remained stable nationally. Residents feel overruled, not convinced. In the Netherlands, the reverse is visible: lead times are longer, but local acceptance of the final route is generally higher, and objections filed at the Council of State are rarely successful.
3. Legal durability. Germany has experienced some painful rulings in which accelerated permits were subsequently overturned by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht — especially where Natura 2000 assessments had been carried out too lightly. The Netherlands is slow, but its decisions tend to hold up at the Council of State. That is not a trivial value: an overturned decision effectively means that any time gained is lost.
4. Cost. Germany pays for its speed. Bundled permit procedures require additional legal capacity in both government and courts, and the generous compensation packages needed to dampen local protest drive project costs upward. Dutch projects are often cheaper in absolute terms, but delay costs (price indexation, redesign, lost capacity) partially consume that advantage.
What can the Netherlands and Germany learn from each other?
The Dutch reflex in the acceleration debate is to point at Germany and say: “It’s allowed there.” That is too easy. What actually works on the German side is mainly the structural bundling of decisions and the creation of legal clarity up front: objectors know on what grounds, at which body and within what timeframe they can act. That is not the same as “less public participation”.
Conversely, Germany is looking with growing interest at the Dutch area-based approach. The first German states are experimenting with Bürgerwindfonds-style arrangements for high-voltage corridors — financial participation of residents in the project itself. That connects seamlessly to what already happens in the Netherlands around wind farms and solar parks, and what stakeholder managers here routinely facilitate.
The real lesson is that speed and support are not opposites, but they do require different operating models. If you want speed, you must invest up front in legal clarity and substantial local coupled opportunities. If you want support, you must be willing to genuinely change the design when objections prove valid. The combination demands a stakeholder manager who can switch between legal-procedural and social-substantive registers.
Conclusion: which approach fits when?
For large, nationally strategic connections — sea corridors, backbone cables, offshore wind connection points — the German model has real advantages. The decision has already been made nationally, alternatives are limited, and dispatch is objectively desirable. The Netherlands would benefit from a legally anchored “overriding interest” clause for a strictly defined list of projects, coupled with shortened objection periods and mandatory compensation packages.
For regional connections — the 150 kV grid, local reinforcements, distribution extensions — the Dutch area-based approach is often more effective. Here there is more room for alternatives, local interests are more diverse, and local support is indispensable for long-term landscape integration. Acceleration here only works if the approach becomes qualitatively better, not procedurally shorter.
The temptation is to copy one model wholesale. The real task is to choose which model fits when — and to structure stakeholder and environmental management so that both modes are available. That is a more mature answer than “more Deutschlandtempo” or “more poldering”. It is the answer the actual grid expansion challenge deserves.